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BOOK REVIEWS
Money in the Law. By Arthur Nussbaum. Chicago: The Foundation
Press, Inc. 1939. Pp. xxxvii, 534. $7.50.
The Legal Aspect of Money with Special Reference to Comparative
and Private International Law. By F. A. Mann. London: Oxford University Press. 1938. Pp. xxv, 334. $7.00.
The appearance of Dr. Nussbaum's long-awaited book on the law
of money is an event of major importance in legal literature, on at
least three counts. Notwithstanding the interrelation of money to every
phase of daily life and daily law, this is the first comprehensive treatment of the subject in English and American law. The only previous
writings were scattered articles in the law reviews, chapters in a few
standard text-books, and incidental legal material in histories or treatises on banking and currency. It is significant of the lack of interest
on the part of our Bar, that the elaboration of the topic should have
been left to a newcomer. Dr. Nussbaum, formerly professor of law
at the University of Berlin, is now visiting professor at Columbia. His
book, if we are not mistaken, is the first authoritative law book in thi
country to be written by a foreigner. That it will be cited as an authority, we have no doubt. Finally, the volume sets a new standard
for law books. Nearly all our books for the last decades have been little
more than glorified digests of cases, useful to the practitioner, but not
of constructive value. Nussbaum follows the continental practice of
the more authoritative commentators; he employs both the historical
and the comparative methods, and holds some vigorous opinions which
he does not hesitate to express vigorously.
The book deserves a more thorough analysis than either time or
space permits. The merits of the work are no more than one could expect after acquaintance with his work in German and the articles heretofore published in English in this country, which are incorporated
as chapters in the book. Dr. Nussbaum established his reputation for
competency in the field by his book Das- Geld issued in 1925 (Spanish
translation 1929). But the present book is in no sense a second and
enlarged edition of his earlier one. Not only has much new law, and
strange law, been established by the monetary crises of the last few
years in so many countries, but the author's further researches into
English and American law have greatly expanded the volume, and
enriched the value, of his work. He very wisely drops the separation
earlier made between theory and practical problems, since theory and
practice should of'course not be separated. He nevertheless adheres to
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the general scheme of arrangement of Das Geld which was motivated
by that distinction. A different arrangement, and a more complete
index, would have made the book more suitable for the American
lawyer. There are eight chapters, dealing with basic monetary conceptions in law, kinds of money (coin, paper money, bank deposits, foreign money), monetary systems (including an outline history of the
dollar and its colonial predecessors), debts in general and under fluctuating currencies, gold clauses and other protective clauses (commodity and index clauses), foreign currency obligations and finally, a new
and bitter subject in law, debts under exchange control.
Nussbaum's basic monetary concept is that money is an ideal unit,
which for legal purposes is to be divorced from its metallic value or
purchasing power value. He repeats the definition of money formulated
by him in Das Geld, as a thing which irrespective of its composition
is by common usage treated as a fraction, integer or multiple of an
ideal unit, the ideal unit varying in each country (e.g., dollar, pound,
mark, franc, etc.) and being the product of an historical, psychological
continuity. From this concept or definition follows the much controverted theory, rule, or what you will, that he designates (adopting the
usual continental nomenclature) as Nominalism. "The essence of nominalism consists in the arithmetical relationship of a given money to the
pertinent ideal unit (dollar, franc, etc.)" (p. 16). A corollary of the
nominalist doctrine (p. 249 et seq.) is the principle of the immutability
of the nominal amount of a debt, irrespective of changes affecting the
metal value, purchasing power or rate of exchange of the unit. This
corollary he apparently derives (although it is a non sequitur) from
the indestructibility of a monetary obligation because of the fact that
impossibility of performance is not a defense.
To this concept, we must register an emphatic dissent. The very
word nominalism is repellent to the ear of a common law lawyer, and
it is this reviewer's contention that the concept has never been incorporated, and may it please their Honors, never will be incorporated
into the common law. The ideal unit notion was laughed out of court
by Canning more than a century ago. His lucid exposition is as true
today as then----"No dream it must be owned could be more extravagant than the visions of those practical men who have undertaken to
refine away the standard of the currency of the realm into a pure abstraction". Canning further attacked "those who after exhausting in
vain every attempt to find an earthly substitute for the legal and ancient standard of our money, have divested the pound sterling of all
the properties of matter, and pursued it, under the name of the 'ideal
unit' into the regions of nonentity and nonsense."
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But we incline to the belief that, perhaps as the result of his recent
researches, Dr. Nussbaum's own faith in nominalism is waning and
that he is whistling in the dark when he finds support for nominalism
in cases and rules where others can find none and when he cavalierly
brushes aside the express language of statutes tying currency to a gold
standard as merely "programmatic". Many leading cases here, in
England, and in international tribunals cannot be reconciled either in
language or conclusion with nominalism (The Feist case and its suc4
cessors, Willard v. Tayloe,2 Thorington v. Smith,3 Bronson v. Rodes,
0
5
the Montano case, the Serbian and Brazilian cases at The Hague, for
example). Nussbaum's admissions, express and implied, go far to
destroy his thesis. He remarks that in England a change in the metal
value of money sometimes led to strange distortions in the application
of old laws (p. 12). These "distortions" were nothing more than a
refusal to apply the nominalist principle. The rule which he approves,
that a debtor in default is not entitled to the benefits of depreciation,
laid down by some early cases and followed in international tribunals,
is inconsistent with the principle. His section entitled "the immutability
of the nominal amount" is largely devoted to the numerous instances
where the nominal amount is not considered immutable. He states
"Although the nominalistic principle has been theoretically and actually
accepted, its boundaries are still to be charted." It does not apply to
damages, unliquidated claims, revaluation, exectifory contracts of various kinds, public utilities (p. 255 et seq.).
The principle seems to boil down to this: If I borrow a hundred
dollars, I have to pay back a hundred dollars, provided no very grave
circumstances have meanwhile intervened.
This obvious proposition, I submit, is an insufficient basis on which
to found a monetary legal theory. We must beware of abstract overcomplication. Perhaps a sufficient basis for all necessary legal conclusions can be found in the primary function of money as a medium
of exchange and in its derivative functions.
In practice, as disclosed by history, the dangers of the nominalist
theory are so great, its results so devastating, that we must guard.
strenuously in this already dogma-shocked world against importing any
such "ism", more pernicious because its poison is subtle, than other
feared "ideologies".
We can, however, look with more indulgence at Dr. Nussbaum's.
Feist v. Socit Intercommunale Beige d'Electriciti, [1934] A. C. 161.
'8 Wall. 557, 19 L. ed. 501 (U. S. 1869).
28 Wail. 1, 19 L. ed. 361 (U. S. 1868).

'7 Wall 229, 19 L. ed. 141 (U. S. 1868).

2

'2 International Arbitrations 1630-38, 1644-49 (Moore, 1864.).
'Cases of Serbian and Brazilian Loans, P. C. I. J., Ser. A, No. 20/21 (1929);
World Ct. Rep. 344, 404 (Hudson, 1935).
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expression of his concept, not only because he restricts it to such a
narrow field but because it does not prevent him from arriving at sound
common-sense solutions of most of the concrete questions he discusses.
For instance, he points out the limitations of the rule that foreign
money is a commodity; offers the constructive suggestion that judgments in cases involving foreign money debts might well direct payment in the foreign currency, thus avoiding the injustices of the present conflicting rules as to time of conversion; limits the importance
of the place of payment in conflicts of law; demonstrates in an unsurpassed way that gold coin clauses are to be treated as gold value
clauses. He, however, does not do justice to what he calls the French
doctrine (it in fact had many precedents, including some early American cases) as to international payments, based on the sound principle
that currency statutes are presumptively territorial, and is timid in
pointing out the necessity of upholding protective safeguards if international intercourse and credit are to survive.
The question of what is to be included or excluded in a book is
one of the most difficult an author faces. Dr. Nussbaum has deliberately excluded some topics which I, as a practicing lawyer, would
have liked to see included, e.g., payment, certain aspects of banking,
taxation, accounting and balance-sheets; the treatment of income taxation of foreign money is too brief to be of any value to a practitioner.
Other topics, which I suggest for the inevitable second edition, many
of which were probably omitted also after due deliberation, include:
many constitutional questions, such as the powers of the states in connection with interest, bank restrictions, gold and similar clauses, truck
acts, bank deposit guaranty laws, as to all of which there are cases,
not cited by him; the extent of the congressional authority to regulate
the value of foreign coin; the delegation of power to the executive.
The more recent cases in regard to bills of credit are not mentioned.
No treatment is given to several early English and numerous American
cases as to depreciated private and state bank notes, which were a frequent source of litigation in the decades before the Civil War. Other
questions of interest to the practitioner to which little or no attention
is given, are rules of evidence, judicial notice, practice and procedure;
the applicability of the Joint Resolution abrogating gold clauses to
the obligations of a sovereign; the status of clearing house certificates,
certified checks and certificates of deposit; alternative provisions to
pay in money or commodities (other than gold); the rule that payment
of a smaller sum does not discharge a liquidated claim, as to which
a comparative law study would be useful; whether banks can tarry deposit accounts in foreign currencies; the questions involved by ear-
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marking gold for foreign account (the statement, p. 75, as to the legal
position of a transferee government is probably too broad); the relative position of head office and branch banks as to foreign money; alternations of a bank note; set-off in connection with foreign currency
claims; the liability of a cable company in connection with cable transfers; and many others.
No one who has not investigated the subject can begin to realize how
scattered in the digests is our case material and therefore how difficult
has been the enormous amount of research, not, only of the cases but
of our and continental literature, reflected in this volume. Only a few
American cases of major importance seem to have been missed. The
most interesting of these are the Supreme Court cases on the change
of sovereignty and currency in Porto Rico, and the early case of Ware
v. Hylton7 enforcing the rights of British creditors to the full sovereign value of their debts under the Peace Treaty, which is discussed
by Dr. Nussbaum at considerable length, though not quite accurately.
The case is important intrinsically; and more so, because it points the
way to a solution, by appropriate treaty provisions, of the international
.monetary problems confronting business. A number of less important,
albeit interesting cases, have been either missed or deliberately omitted.
As to cases cited, there is a tendency to over-condensation in statement,
resulting in some misleading implications as to the ruling. We cannot
here pause to give a bill of particulars; we can do no more than sound
a cautionary note.
A graver caution is also necessary. Decades of struggle in the
courts and market places have given me the courage to believe that
I can better appreciate the spirit of the common law and of our equity
jurisprudence than any academician. Dr. Nussbaum, in company with
so many of his associates at Columbia and elsewhere, fails to fully
realize that our law is based on experience. The common law is the
law of the common man. No human experience is alien to it. None
can be discarded from legal reasoning. Especially no Anglo-American
lawyer can ever forget our classic struggles for liberty and resistance
to any form of despotic control. We reject any notion that money is
owned not by the individual citizen but by the State. We reject any
monopolistic control of the currency, be it by a capitalist group or by
a central government. Neglect of these factors and their congeners
leads Dr. Nussbaum into error or misapprehension. He underestimates
the real grounds of the opposition to the Legal Tender acts and the
gold clause legislation. He fails in sympathy for our early currency
experiments, granted that they were economically misguided. His dis73 Dal. 199, 1 L. ed. 568 (U. S. 1796).
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cussion of Briscoe v. Commonwealth Bank8 is especially defective on
this score. He underestimates the role of courts of equity in our system and our insistence upon an independent judiciary. He nowhere
refers to the principle, firmly fixed in the law since the days of Locke
until the year of Grace 1933, of the sanctity of the mint weight of the
standard money. He makes fhe astounding statement (despite the
views of the Supreme Court in the Perry case 9) that the giving of a
promise by a government to redeem its obligations is in some respects
more reprehensible than its breach (p. 83). He indulges, in the recent
unfortunate law-school fashion, in dubiously justifiable attacks on the
courts.
Dr. Mann's doctoral thesis is more limited in scope than Dr. Nussbaum's treatise, but serves well to supplement it by its greater emphasis
on English law and history, somewhat slighted by Nussbaum. It analyzes more extensively and critically the recent English cases, especially in the second part dealing with foreign money obligations-a more
lucid presentation than Dr. Nussbaum's, whose material on public and
private international law is scattered all through the book. The first
part of Dr. Mann's book deals with the legal problems of money in
general. An appendix includes three heretofore unreported English
cases.
Dr. Mann (a doctor of laws of Berlin and London) is a disciple
of Dr. Nussbaum and an even more fervent Nominalist, notwithstanding his naive confession (p. 72) that "the scarcity of English authorities for the nominalistic principle and the complete lack of any legal
discussion thereof are very remarkable indeed." He carries the principle (p. 192) to such an exaggerated extent as to practically exclude
any intention of the parties however clear; he also attaches exaggeratod
importance to legal tender, taking issue on this point with Nussbaum.
His nominalism takes the most funest form-the State theory of
money-and he criticizes Nussbaum's society theory, which is sounder,
or at least more in accord with our law. Nussbaum holds quite correctly that it is not sufficient for the State to declare something to be
money; money must be adopted by society and custom.
The State theory of money is nothing more than a reversion to the
medieval concept of arbitrary unlimited power against which every
principle of English and American constitutional law firmly rebels.
Nominalism is fraught with the gravest perils, as the history of less
fortunate parts of the world has amply demonstrated, not only to the
economic structure, but to all respect for fundamental legal institutions
-to property, liberty, the pursuit of happiness and even to life itself
'11 Pet. 257, .9 L. ed. 709, 928 (U. S. 1837).
Perry v. United States, 294 U. S. 330, 55 Sup. Ct. 432, 79 L. ed. 912 (1935).
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(executions have not been infrequent). These are not "sentimental"
arguments, as characterized by Nussbaum. Repudiation or confiscation
in any form or guise cannot be too emphatically condemned. Their
effects cannot be insulated. No small part of the current chaos in international relations is attributable to the lack of respect for law engendered by currency monstrosities and to the bad examples set by
governments. The moral position of our own Government before the
world would be stronger had it also not fallen a victim.
The world's currencies today are in a pathological condition. A
healthy theory of money must be built on a healthy money, not on diseased manifestations. There will come a reaction in favor of the
view that the best monetary system is one that is subject to the automatic controls of commerce rather than to dictation by the State. If
it has ceased to be a part of our system that "honest money is a thing
of intrinsic value and cannot with impunity be tampered with", the
sooner we get back to it the better.
PHANOR J. EDER.
New York City.
Government Corporations and Federal Funds. By John McDiarmid. 1
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1938. Pp. xvii, 244.
$2.50.
Government Corporations in English Speaking Countries.
By John
Thurston. 2 Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1939. Pp. xii,
294. $3.50.
Both of these books have been written by political scientists. Neither
book is, or purports to be, a law book and neither has a table of cases
or a digest of the statutes referred to in connection with the respective
government-owned corporations discussed therein. These omissions,
coupled with the almost inextricable mixture of law, fact, and theory,
have made the books of little practical value to the practicing lawyer
or government administrator except for the purpose of showing the
devices which have been adopted in this country within recent years
to launch the Federal Government into competition with the taxpayers
who support these same devices.
Professor McDiarmid urges, and Professor Thurston echoes his
view with a slightly less vociferous statement, that in the interests of
efficiency of operation the federal administrative spending agenciesand particularly government-owned corporations-should be permitted
a wider latitude of discretion in expending public monies. Professor
'Department

of Politics, Princeton University.

'Department of Political Science, Northwestern University.
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McDiarmid proposes that the comptrolling functions, now exercised by
the General Accounting Office which is responsible solely to Congress,
be vested largely in the administration itself. In weighing the value
of the theories stated in these two books it is well to bear in mind a
statement made in May, 1938, by Dean Emeritus Roscoe Pound of
the Harvard Law School before a subcommittee of the United States
Senate Judiciary Committee, as follows:
"You have to discount a good deal you find in the books in our
academic circles, because I do not think the non-lawyer or layman has
quite appreciated what our legal situation was, on the one hand, or
the legal situation behind the development of administration, on the
other hand. It requires a good deal of understanding of legal history
and legal development to appreciate a situation of that sort. . . .The
in some quarters.
doctrine of administrative absolutism is very strong
3
I am afraid it is strongest in the universities."
If exhibits should be required in support of Dean Pound's conclusion that there are doctrinaires of administrative absolutism in the colleges, the book by Professor McDiarmid may be offered as an exhibit.
Some of the brightest pages of Anglo-American legal history are
those recounting the struggle between the governed and the governors
over the control of the public purse. Even in early days practical
men in government knew what some theorists apparently do not know
today: that legislative control over public money cannot trust to prescribing the uses thereof. The legislative authority must go further
and control the governmental machinery necessary to prevent any other
use of the money. 4 As early as the reign of William and Mary this
control was made good in the people when Parliament resolutely refused to'permit the executive to spend without its approval before
withdrawal of the public money, and without its subsequent approval
of the accounts showing the expenditures. By such a control over colonial funds, the people of the various colonies triumphed in their struggles with the crown or proprietary governors.5 The Congress of the
Confederation had a similar legislative and accounting control. The
men who drafted the Federal Constitution, in their concern lest the
executive have the power of both purse and sword, reserved to the
Congress the sole power to raise revenue, to determine its uses, and to
appropriate public money for prescribed uses. After the adoption of
'Hearing on S. 3676, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess. (1938) 177.
' See my testimony and the documents before the committee in the hearings

on S. 2700, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) 366, 422, and the Report of the Brookings Institution to the Select Committee on Investigation of Executive Agencies
of Government (Senator Byrd's committee on Reorganization), 75th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1937).
' See colonial and pre-constitution state statutes collected in footnote NP. 43a
to McGuire, Legislative or Executive Control over Accounting for Federal

Funds (1926) 20 ILL. L. REv. 455, 466.
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the Constitution the First Congress established the-system of congressional approval of administrative expenditures and a subsequent accounting therefor. The accounting control functions were nominally a
part of the Treasury Department with the requirement that the Secretary of that department report direct to the Congress and not to the
president, as did the other executive agencies. While this requirement
obtains to this day, nevertheless the Treasury, because of its efficiency,
has been developed into a great operating and spending agency. Unless the Treasury was to be permitted to control-and account toitself, it became necessary to take the accounting officers out of the
Treasury and this was done in the Budget and Accounting Act of
1921.6
However, throughout this period of one hundred and fifty years no
chief executive claimed or exercised the power to revise or review
the audits and settlements made by the accounting officers who have
been required to enforce various and sundry statutes regulating and
controlling the exercise of administrative discretion in the spending
of public money. While the various Comptrollers during this period
of one hundred and fifty years may not have been legal giants and some
of them may have made grievous errors, yet no breath of scandal has
touched a single one of them in the discharge of his official duties.
Generally speaking, economy-minded members of the Congress did the
expected and rushed to the Comptrollers' assistance even though the
errors and mistakes were not condoned; and notwithstanding the efforts
to persuade it-to do so, the 75th Congress refused to carry out suggestions, some of which are repeated in this book, that there be surrendered to the spending agencies control functions in the expenditure of
public money.
Not being able to get around the control of Congress through the
Comptrollers, or to secure repeal of various statutes7 limiting the exercise of discretion in the expenditure of public money, an influx of
corporate experienced men into the federal service during the World
War resorted to the establishment of a number of government-owned
corporations, referred to in both of these books. By so doing, these
men used the corporate device, with which they were most familiar in
private life, and they attained that freedom from legislative and accounting control which Professor McDiarmid finds to be so desirable
and with which Professor Thurston seems not to be so enamoured,
though he suggests that perhaps the statutes creating such corporations
42

STAT. 24 (1921), 31 U. S. C. A. §44 (1927).
See Report of President's Commission on Economy and Efficiency, H. R.
Doc. No 854, 62nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1911) 59-121, and H. R. 129, 67th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1921).
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or providing for their organization could, and should leave more discretion in the officers of government-owned corporations.
The attempt of Professor McDiarmid to make a showing of necessity for the organization since 1916 of government-owned corporations
is a weak one. He refers to the work being done by the Tennessee
Valley Authority, a government-owned corporation with three directors,
but he wrote before the Joint Committee of the Senate and House made
its investigation and report concerning such work and the dissensions
among the directors, resulting in a divided report on party lines 8-as
was the general situation after a legislative investigation of the former
United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation. However, Professor McDiarmid fails even to mention the fact that the
Bureau of Reclamation, in the Department of the Interior, has built
more and larger dams than has the T. V. A. for nearly half a century,
and particularly within the past twenty-five years, and has sold both
water and electricity in connection with such dams, without any congressional investigations, without the filing of any serious charges in
connection with the work, and without resort to a government-owned
corporation in an attempt to escape legislative and accounting control.
A similar statement could be made with respect to the vast number of
great navigational dams built by the Engineer Corps of the Army during the past fifty years.
However, Professor McDiarmid does admit that he is informed by
the officials in charge of the Prison Industries, a government-owned
corporation for the conduct of shoe factories, furniture factories, canvas
duck mills, etc., in the federal prisons, that the legislative and accounting control-the provision for which was placed by this reviewer in the
hands of a Senate subcommittee which inserted it into the statute-has
been of great assistance to the functioning of that corporation. This
experience, as well as the -instances of the Bureau of Reclamation and
the Engineer Corps of the Army, demonstrates that there is no particular virtue in the corporate device for the transaction of public business, except in banking operation-and this is largely due to habit. If
there must be a government-owned and operated corporation for the
conduct of some public business of a specialized character, the financial
control provisions in the authorizing statute for the Prison Industries
are well-nigh perfect-and this statement is made without any pride
of authorship.
Again, it is suggested by Professor McDiarmid that freedom in
making purchases by such corporations as the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Panama Railroad Company enables the corporations to
' Report of the Joint Committee Investigating the Tennessee Valley Authority,
76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939).
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carry in their commissaries the supplies needed or required by their
customers. Presumably he has overlooked the fact that for many years
the post-exchanges and commissaries operated by the Army and Navy,
respectively, for the convenience of their personnel, have made purchases for resale purposes regularly without advertising and award of
contract to the lowest responsible bidder.
In suggesting that the Comptroller General went beyond his authority in requiring judgments against the United States arising out of
Shipping Board Emergency Corporation matters to be sent to his office
for settlement, the author overlooked the terms of a statute which prescribed such procedure for all judgments rendered against the United
States except in specific instances where the terms of the .appropriations
permitted a different procedure.9
Where this book by Professor McDiarmid attempts to theorize and
condemn, that is, where it departs. from factual reporting of the organization and activities of the several government-owned corporations
therein considered, it leaves much to be desired in that it fails to show
that knowledge of legal and constitutional developments of the Federal Government and that grasp of detail with respect to both the regular federal departmental and corporate activities without' which no
one should attempt to suggest governmental policies in the administration of the law. I fail to see wherein any useful purpose is served by
the publication of this book in its present form.
The book by Professor Thurston discloses a much more thorough
investigation of the entire subject, though here the discussion of the
federal corporate device is against somewhat similar corporate devices
in England, Australia, Canada, and South Africa. Such a comparative
study, while of value, is likewise dangerous to the uninformed because,
except for the Australian Commonwealth and the United States, none
of the other governments operates under a rigid constitution with a
tripartite division of governmental power and in a federal system with
a reservation to the states, or the people thereof, of all governmental
power not expressly or impliedly delegated to the Federal Government.
No parliamentary form of government-so interesting to many academicians-could exist in America with its vast territory, federated system,
conflicting interests, and various other factors not present in any existing parliamentary government.
It is hoped that some lawyer will soon write a scholarly book on
government-owned corporations which wili not only constitute a reference for the busy lawyer and administrator but which will make an
'33 SThT.422 (1904), 31 U. S C. A. §583(2) (1927) and 33 STAT. 41 (1904).
31 U. S. C. A. §228 (1927), as amended by the Budget and Accounting Act of
1921, 42 STAT. 23, 27 (1921).
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unbiased evaluation of the work performed and expense incurred by
such corporations in contrast with similar work performed and expense
incurred by the regular administrative agencies of government.

0. R. McGUIRE.10
Arlington, Va.
The Law of Automobiles in North Carolina.
By Vartanian; Second
Edition by the Michie Company. Charlottesville: The Michie Company. 1938. Pp. 728. $12.00.
This volume concerns the law of automobiles. Beyond that, the
title is not accurate. It might more correctly be named "The Law of
Automobiles with Citation of Authority largely from Virginia, West
Virginia, Tennessee and North Carolina". The text is perhaps flexible
enough to be capable of use in Virginia, West Virginia, Tennessee or
North Carolina, although certainly it cannot be definitely applicable to
all four jurisdictions. Here the authors have the advantage of the
fact that there is no North Carolina law of automobiles very different
from the Virginia law of automobiles, except in matters of detail.
Since most of this so-called "law of automobiles" is the application of
the common law rules, principles and standards, known as the law of
negligence, to modern transportation by motor vehicle, and since the
statutes governing motor vehicle operation tend to conform to a uniform statute, the law of the forty-eight states is substantially in agreement.
Because of this fact, a treatise on the law of automobiles of a
designated state should be sure to deal with all local deviations from
the general doctrine. For this reason, section 233, dealing with the
rule of res ipsa loquitur, is objectionable. The rule discussed in this
section is stated in terms of "prima facie evidence of negligence". That
is not the North Carolina rule of "evidence enough to get to the jury",
and only three out of seventy or eighty cases cited on nine pages of
text and footnotes are North Carolina cases. The leading North Carolina cases are not discussed and therefore, no matter how good the
discussion is, it is not a discussion of the North Carolina law. On the
application of -the doctrine of res ipsa to skidding, the authors cite the
case of Springs v. Doll,' but apparently overlook two more recent cases.2
1" Chairman. Committee on Administrative Law, American
and of the Committee on Administrative Law, The Virginia
ciation; Counsel to the Comptroller General of the United
Special Assistant to various Attorneys General of the United

Bar Association,
State Bar AssoStates; sometime
States.

N. C. 24(0, 148 S.E. 251 (1929), cited in footnote 22, p. 601.
York v. York, 212 N. C. 695, 194 S. E. 486 (1938); Clodfelter v. Wells,
212 N. C. 823, 195 S.E. 11 (1938).
1197
2
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A similar objection is found in the discussion of negligence per se 3 and
of the contributory negligence of minors. 4 In each case, the text misses
the correct statement of the North Carolina law and fails to give an
adequate analytical treatment. Important North Carolina cases are
either omitted or merely cited in footnotes. There are good discussions
of these topics in the North Carolina Law Review5 which would be
more useful to North Carolina lawyers. In fact, of the thirty-five or
forty articles, notes and case comments dealing with the law of automobiles, found in the pages of the North Carolina.Law Review, not a
single one is referred to in this volume. The unusual case of contribution between insurers of joint tort feasors, Gaffney v. Casualty Co.,6
discussed in 15 North Carolina Law Review 289, is not to be found.
Closer reference to these law review discussions would have tended to
greater accuracy of statement concerning the North Carolina law.
A reader of a treatise on the North Carolina law might expect that
North Carolina decisions would be given a leading position in the citation order, but the publisher of this volume is a Virginia corporation
and the editorial staff is more familiar with the Virginia law and may,
therefore, believe that cases from the Old Dominion should always be
put first, even in a North Carolina law book. There are probably twice
as many Virginia cases commented upon and cited as there are North
Carolina cases. For purposes of sampling, this proposition holds true
on pages 18 to 27, inclusive, where illustrative cases are set out in the
text. Again at page 436, the topic is "Liability to Invitees and Licensees" and seven pages are entirely devoted to the "Virginia rule", while
only two and one-half pages cover the so-called "Tennessee, North Carolina, and West Virginia rule". For a treatise on North Carolina law,
this is not quite orthodox, especially as the North Carolina doctrine is
the common law view. But we must remember that the volume is really
a general treatise with an 'attempt to make it applicable to particular
states.
The present volume is a second edition of Vartanian, Law of Autoinobiles in North Carolina,by the same publisher in 1929, and the general outline of the earlier volume is followed. The text has been
improved in many respects, the footnotes are brought up to date and
there is a table of North Carolina cases, alphabetically arranged. As
' Sec. 24-26.
Sec. 16.
Note, Public Wrong anzd Private Action in North Carolina (1923) 1 N. C.,
L. REv. 192; Note, Negligence Per Se (1929) 7 N. C. L. REv. 482; Note, Contributory Negligence of Miiwrs-Question for Court or Jury (1936) 15 N. C. L.
REv. 75 (commenting on Hollingsworth v. Burns, 210 N. C. 40, 185 S. E. 476
[1936], 6ited in the footnotes to §24 of the volume under review).
A complete list of the North Carolina Law Review discussions of cases referred to in the treatise or of topics relating to the Law of Automobiles would
disclose
reader
interested in this field of the law.
6209 much
N. C. of
515,interest
184 S.toE.a 46
(1936).

